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CONTENTS

	Page
Results of the Washington Conference of 1921-22	312
The Geneva Naval Conference	316
1. The Question of Parity	318
2. The Question of Ten-thousand-ton Cruisers	320
3. The Question of Tonnage Levels	323
Factors Contributing to the Geneva Failure	326
The Charge of Inadequate Preparation	327
The Possible Existence of War	327
Public Opinion in Great Britain and the United States	328
British and American Building Programs	329
Appendix I. Tables Relating to Foreign Trade, Merchant Marine Tonnage, Naval Expenditures, etc.	332
Appendix II. Comparative Strength in Auxiliary Vessels	333-334
Appendix III. Names and Characteristics of Principal Surface Vessels— United States, Great Britain and Japan	335-341

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The International Naval Situation

DURING the present session Congress will be called upon to consider a "Bill to Provide for Increase of the Naval Establishment," presented in the House of Representatives, December 14, 1927, and calling for construction of seventy-one vessels at an estimated cost of \$725,000,000. Discussion of this bill, which embodies the second largest building program in the history of this country, will bring to the forefront the question of the failure of the Three-Power Naval Conference held at Geneva last summer.

The present report attempts to review briefly, but impartially, naval developments since the Washington Conference. It presents a summary of the negotiations at Geneva together with other factors relating to the international naval situation.

The writings of Admiral Mahan have demonstrated the importance of sea power in history; and his conclusions were seemingly enforced by the events of the World War. Had it not been for Allied sea power, the German submarine blockade would probably have reduced the Allies to subjection. In a mere battle of navies, the

outcome of the war would not perhaps have been decisive, but those land forces which had the strongest naval support won the day.

In the past, the battleship has been the basis of sea-power. The battleship bears the brunt of the fighting; it is capable of keeping the seas regardless of weather; and its underwater body is minutely compartmented in order to give protection against torpedoes and mines. The Washington Naval Treaty limited the size of battleships to 35,000 tons displacement and guns to a calibre not exceeding 16 inches. The battleship has a moderate speed usually from 18 to 25 knots, and its guns have a range of 20,000 yards. Since capital ships form the backbone of the navy, they remain concentrated as a unit, to prevent individual destruction by concentrated enemy attack.

Cruisers have a wider number of uses than battleships.¹ They are used not only for scouting purposes, but also to guard

¹ U. S. Navy Dept. *Information Concerning the U. S. Navy and Other Navies*, March, 1927. p. 17. Statement of Admiral E. W. Eberle to the Senate Naval Committee, January 12, 1927.

lines of supply for the fleet, to protect merchant sea-borne commerce, to enforce blockades, and to operate against an enemy fleet's line of supply. In battle, cruisers are used to support the attacks of destroyers and submarines. The cruiser's armor is lighter and its guns are smaller than those of the capital ship; but it compensates for these factors by great speed—many of them making up to 35 knots. The Washington Naval Treaty fixed their maximum displacement at 10,000 tons, and limited their guns to eight-inch calibre.

FUNCTIONS OF AUXILIARY VESSELS

Unlike the capital ship and cruiser, whose principal weapon is gun-fire, destroyers and submarines usually attack by means of undersea torpedoes. A large destroyer has a displacement of 1,200 tons and a speed of from 30 to 35 knots. It carries torpedo tubes with 8 to 12 torpedoes, and guns of a four-inch calibre. The destroyer is the best opponent of the submarine "because of its high speed, facility for quick manoeuvring of its rapid-fire guns, torpedoes, and depth bombs."² A destroyer leader is a large destroyer type for use as a flagship for a squadron.

While the destroyer is of great defensive value against the submarine, its offensive rôle is considered very important by naval experts, because of the torpedo broadside which it may direct against battleships, when operating in large numbers. Some destroyers are also equipped for mine-laying work.

The use of the submarine is well-known. It is an under-sea craft which uses torpedoes and which may lay mines with the object not only of attacking merchant ships but men-of-war.

A new type of sea power has recently come into existence in the form of naval aircraft, which is used to obtain information and for purposes of attack. Perhaps its greatest value is in "spotting" the enemy ships, and thus increasing the accuracy of gunfire. In order to carry aircraft and to act as a floating hangar, the aircraft carrier

has been created. The United States has just completed the two largest aircraft carriers in existence, the *Lexington* and the *Saratoga*, each of which has a displacement of 33,000 tons.

The effective life of war vessels depends upon many considerations, including such factors as size, care in construction, climatic conditions under which they operate and the like. The period of usefulness depends upon the advance in scientific achievement and new inventions. In general, it is estimated that the life of a battleship may well be extended upwards of 20 years, of a large cruiser to 18-20 years, destroyers 16 years and submarines 13 years. At the end of such periods, even if a vessel is structurally sound, the cost of repairs and upkeep and the progress of science generally makes its replacement the wise and economical course. The cost of surface vessels may roughly be placed at \$1,000 a ton, with submarines considerably more expensive because of their intricate mechanism. Fleet submarines cost as much as \$6,000,000. A modern cruiser costs between \$10,000,000 and \$17,000,000. A modern battleship costs approximately \$35,000,000.

The cost of capital ship construction has increased five times during the last twenty years.³

Annual maintenance and replacement charges are also high. The annual cost for the H. M. S. *Hood*, the largest war ship afloat, is about \$2,200,000. Senator Frederick Hale, chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, estimates that in order to keep our fleet up to strength, the United States must expend annually \$60,000,000 in replacement.⁴

PRE-WAR SUPREMACY OF BRITISH NAVY

For three hundred years before the World War, the British Empire was in command of the seas, a command which in the eyes of England was necessary to protect the widespread dominions of the Empire and to insure the food supply and the trade of the people of the British Isles. The

2. Ibid. p. 76.

3. Bywater, H. C. *Navies and Nations*. p. 14.

4. U. S. *Congressional Record*. January 21, 1927. p. 2061.

German Navy Law of 1898 challenged this supremacy. It was met by the reply that Great Britain would maintain a Two-Power standard—a navy equal in strength to that of any other two European powers. In the opinion of many writers, the naval rivalry between Great Britain and Germany, which was a reflex of political and commercial rivalry, had much to do with bringing about the World War.

During and immediately following the war, British supremacy of the seas was challenged by the United States. Aroused by the fears of the German naval power and the needs of protecting troop transports and commerce, the American Congress passed a Naval Appropriation Act in 1916 which authorized the construction within three years of ten first-class battleships, six battle cruisers, and a large number of smaller vessels. The execution of this program was delayed by America's entrance into the war and the diversion of building facilities to submarines and merchantmen. At the close of the war, however, construction was resumed. The avowed purpose of American policy, as defined by the General Board of the Navy, was the creation of a "navy equal to the most powerful maintained" by any other nation in the world. Had the American program been completed, the American navy would have been actually stronger than the British navy in 1924.

In the years immediately following the Armistice and the elimination of the German fleet, the British Government curtailed construction and even went so far as to do away with the Home Fleet. But, in 1921, it again began construction of capital ships, and Mr. Winston Churchill, soon after the armistice, declared "Nothing in the world, nothing that you may think of, or dream of, or anyone may tell you; no arguments, however specious, no appeals, however seductive, must lead you to abandon that naval supremacy on which the life of our country depends."⁵

The first step in naval disarmament came at the close of the World War which brought to a humiliating end the powerful German fleet. The Armistice Agreement

obliged Germany to surrender all of its submarines to the Allies and to dismantle or intern all surface warships.

The Treaty of Versailles limited the German navy to 6 small battleships, 6 light cruisers, 12 destroyers and 12 torpedo boats. Upon replacement, armored ships are limited to 10,000 tons, light cruisers to 6,000 tons, destroyers to 800 tons and torpedo boats to 200 tons.⁶

The Treaty absolutely prohibits the construction or use of submarines, even for commercial purposes, by Germany.

These crushing provisions had no effect upon the capital ship program of the United States, nor did they prevent the British Government from reviving capital ship construction in 1921. Moreover, the building program of the United States, together with its Far Eastern policy, was apparently instrumental in causing the adoption by Japan of the so-called "eight-eight" program in 1920 under which Japan planned to build a navy of 16 capital ships (nearly as large a navy as the United States has today) by 1928.

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE OF 1921-22

In the midst of an apparently impending naval competition between governments which were Associates and Allies during the World War, the American Government invited Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy to participate with it in a Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armaments—a Conference which also dealt with certain Pacific and Far Eastern questions. The Conference met in Washington from November, 1921 to February, 1922. Mr. Charles Evans Hughes, the American Secretary of State, proposed that the United States give up its "1916" program and that Japan give up its "eight-eight" program so that the American and British fleets would approach equality while the Japanese fleet would be about sixty per cent as strong—the 5-5-3 ratio.

After a month's negotiation, an agreement was reached in regard to battleships, according to which the three leading naval powers agreed to scrap a total of 70 ships,

5. Bywater. *Navies and Nations*. p. 21.

6. *Treaty of Versailles*. Articles 181, 190, 191.

built or building, having a total tonnage of about 1,644,839 tons. The United States made the greatest sacrifice, scrapping a total of 32 ships.⁷ All of the governments had carried out their scrapping obligations by February 17, 1925.

In addition to scrapping these vessels, the governments agreed not to lay down any new building programs except for replacement which may begin only in 1931. Ordinarily, a battleship may not be replaced until 20 years after its construction.

Replacement is to be made so that eventually the United States and Great Britain will have a total of 15 battleships each, with a tonnage of 525,000; Japan, 9 battleships with a tonnage of 315,000; France and Italy, 5 battleships each, with a tonnage of 175,000.

The Washington Treaty also limited the total tonnage of aircraft carriers to 135,000 tons in the case of the United States and the British Empire; 60,000 tons in the case of France and Italy; and 81,000 tons in the case of Japan.⁸

TREATY FAILS TO LIMIT AUXILIARIES

While the Washington Conference was successful in limiting capital ships, it failed to put an end to competition in the building of submarines, destroyers, cruisers and aircraft. France blocked the limitation of submarine building, contending that a submarine tonnage of at least 90,000 tons was essential to the defense of the French colonies and as a substitute for the inferior position France was obliged to occupy in regard to capital ships, owing to its inability to construct such ships during the World War. But Great Britain declined to make any agreement authorizing this figure, in the belief that such a great number of submarines would be a menace to England. When no agreement proved possible in regard to submarines, England declined to limit cruisers on the ground that they were a necessary defense against submarine attack.

The Washington Naval Treaty defined the maximum size at which battleships,

cruisers, and aircraft carriers could be fixed. The limit for battleships was fixed at 35,000 tons; cruisers, at 10,000 tons and aircraft carriers at 27,000 tons. Sixteen-inch guns were authorized for capital ships and eight-inch guns for cruisers and aircraft carriers. These maximum sizes have been criticized as unduly liberal. With one exception the largest battleship in existence at the time of the Washington Conference was 33,800 tons, and the majority were under 30,000 tons; the largest aircraft carrier was 22,600 tons; and the average cruiser was 6,000 tons—the limit fixed for German cruisers in the Treaty of Versailles. These maximum limits tended to become the standard upon which naval construction in the future should be based. One reason for fixing these limits was the fact that cruisers laid down in 1916 and 1917, by Great Britain, were designed to have a tonnage of 9,750 tons. As a result of the Washington Treaty, the cost of construction as well as the power of these vessels increased.

The Washington Naval Treaty remains in force until December 31, 1936, and thereafter it shall continue in force until the expiration of two years after notice by any party of its intention to terminate.

If, during the term of the treaty, the "requirements of the national security" of any contracting power "in respect of naval defense," are, in the opinion of that power, materially affected by any change of circumstances, the Contracting Powers will, at its request, meet in conference with a view to the revision of the treaty and its amendment by mutual agreement.

"In view of possible technical and scientific developments," the United States shall arrange for a conference of all the Contracting Powers, which shall convene as soon as possible after the expiration of eight years from the coming into force of the treaty—or August, 1931.⁹

MODERNIZATION OF CAPITAL SHIPS

Following the Washington Conference, the American Navy Department mapped

7. Conference on the Limitation of Armaments, Washington, 1921/22. [Minutes]. p. 1573 ff.

8. Idem.

9. The treaty went into force in August, 1923. Cf. *Treaty Limiting Naval Armament*, Feb. 6, 1922. Articles XXI, XXII.

out plans for modernizing the capital ships retained under the treaty, particularly in regard to converting coal burning ships into oil burning ships and increasing the elevation of turret guns, the result of both measures being to increase the strength of our treaty vessels. A statement made by the Navy Department, to the effect that Britain had already increased the gun elevation on her battleships,¹⁰ was the chief motivation for an appropriation of \$6,500,000 for a similar purpose by the 67th Congress of the United States. The bill contained a clause stipulating that the vessels should be modernized after it had been determined that this act did not violate the Washington Treaty. However, because of a subsequent statement of the British Government that the information concerning her previous elevation of guns was erroneous,¹¹ the Secretary of the Navy announced that United States action would be postponed until after Congress had again considered the subject.

In his annual report of November 15, 1923, Secretary of the Navy Denby asked for an appropriation for gun elevation and stated that such a move did not violate the Washington Treaty. There was considerable discussion of the matter and the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs finally decided against it, on the advice of President Coolidge. Nevertheless, a "Big Navy" group in the Senate introduced a new bill providing for the reappropriation of \$6,500,000 for this purpose.

UNITED STATES CONGRESS URGES GUN ELEVATION

On July 30, 1924 it was announced in the British Parliament that representations to the United States and Japan had been made stating that the alteration of gun levels would, in the opinion of the British Government, be a violation of the Naval Treaty which states that "no alterations in side armor, in calibre, number or general type of mounting of main armament shall be permitted. . . ."¹² The American Navy

Department denied that this provision had been violated on the ground that gun elevation was never discussed by American officials at the Washington Conference, and that the Administration considered that the necessary elevation could not be regarded as reconstruction within the meaning of the treaty.¹³ There was no conflict of opinion on this point between the State and Navy Departments. Finally, however, due mainly to the opposition of President Coolidge, the fight was dropped in the House early in January, 1925. On January 19, 1925, the Senate voted against the appropriation, thus supporting the President.¹⁴

The question of gun elevation was temporarily put aside, but early in 1927 the fight began again in Congress. On February 28, 1927, the House passed a bill authorizing alterations to the U. S. S. *Oklahoma* and *Nevada*, subject to the limitations prescribed in the Washington Treaty. This bill was subsequently passed by the Senate and signed by President Coolidge. The appropriation was not made, however, and a Deficiency Bill providing the necessary money is now before Congress. In reporting out this bill, the House Appropriations Committee stipulated that no part of the money shall be "expended for alterations to increase the range of the turret guns of such ships."

On December 9, 1927, the House voted by 215 to 75 that this provision be struck from the bill, in spite of the claims of Representative Madden, head of the Appropriations Committee, and Representative French, Chairman of the Naval Subcommittee, that such gun elevation would violate the spirit of the Washington Treaty.¹⁵

MOVEMENT FOR PARITY IN CRUISERS

While the Washington Treaty placed no restrictions upon the construction of auxiliary craft, it was soon pointed out in Congress that the United States was inferior to England in cruisers. Consequently a move-

10. U. S. Naval Affairs Committee (House). *Hearings on Sundry Legislation affecting the Naval Establishment, 1922-23. 67th Cong.* p. 1645. Statement of Hon. Edwin Denby.

11. U. S. Navy Dept. *Annual Report of Secretary, 1923.* p. 75.

12. Great Britain. House of Commons. *Debates.* New Series 5. Vol. 176, col. 2033.

13. Schofield, Captain F. H. "A Memorandum on the Gun-Elevation Question." (In U. S. Navy Dept. *Annual Report of the Secretary, 1923.* p. 114.)

14. U. S. *Congressional Record*, January 19, 1925. p. 2061.

15. U. S. *Congressional Record*, December 9, 1927. p. 408.

ment arose to increase the number of cruisers in the American navy, not only for the purpose of establishing parity with England, but also for the purpose of filling out the needs of the American fleet which, in the opinion of naval officers, was over-balanced with capital ships. In January, 1925, the Secretary of the Navy stated that in the opinion of the Navy Department, it would be desirable to establish a 5-5-3 ratio in regard to cruisers. In order to arrive at such a ratio, the Navy Department estimated that the United States must construct 21 10,000-ton cruisers.¹⁶

Nevertheless, the Congress of the United States and the Administration did not wish to embark on a heavy cruiser building program so long as there was prospect for an international limitation of cruisers similar to that of battleships. On January 22, 1923, the Naval Appropriation bill was approved containing a provision requesting the President "to enter into negotiations with the Governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan with the view of reaching an understanding or agreement relative to limiting the construction of all types and sizes of sub-surface and surface craft of 10,000 tons standard displacement or less, and of aircraft."¹⁷

The Naval Appropriation bill, approved December 18, 1924, contained the following provision:

(Section 4). "That in the event of an international conference for the limitation of naval armament, the President is hereby empowered at his discretion to suspend in all or in part any or all alterations or construction authorized in this Act."¹⁸

The Naval Appropriation Bill approved February 11, 1925, contained a provision requesting the President to call a conference to limit armaments on land and sea.¹⁹

BRITISH AND JAPANESE CRUISER PROGRAMS

In the meantime, other governments had been drawing up cruiser programs. The

lead in this direction in 1922-23 was taken by Japan and France, both of whom were weak in cruisers. While Great Britain laid down one cruiser in this period, and while the United States laid down none, Japan began the construction of 6 cruisers, 15 destroyers and 11 submarines, while France laid down 3 cruisers, 18 destroyers and 11 submarines. At present Japan has more ocean-going submarines than any other Power.

In August, 1925, the Conservative Government of Great Britain adopted the so-called Birkenhead building program designed to cover requirements for the ensuing five years. This program called for the construction of sixteen ships, four to be built in the first year and three in each following year.²⁰ Nine of these sixteen ships were to be 10,000-ton cruisers, while seven were to be 8,000 tons.

The British Admiralty was criticized for this policy, as it was criticized for taking the initiative in building the Super-Dreadnaughts before the war. The construction of Dreadnaughts, having a great superiority over earlier battleships, automatically rendered obsolete ordinary vessels not only in the German but in the British navy. As a result of this innovation, Great Britain was obliged to discard 75 ships in comparison with Germany's 28 and Germany was able to start on an even basis with England. As a result of the reform, Great Britain lost a tremendous naval preponderance. By initiating the construction of 10,000-ton cruisers, the British Admiralty was charged with making a similar mistake. The British Admiralty apparently attempted to rectify this error at the Geneva Conference by proposing the limitation of the construction of 10,000-ton cruisers in the future.

Just prior to the Geneva Conference the British Empire had a total of forty-eight cruisers built—forty first line and eight second line—with a total tonnage of 240,036. In addition it had eleven cruisers building with a tonnage of 110,000 tons, three authorized and appropriated for but

16. U. S. Naval Affairs Committee (House). *Hearings on Sundry Legislation Affecting the Naval Establishment, 1926-27*. 69th Cong. p. 173.

17. U. S. Statutes at Large. Vol. 42, Pt. 1. p. 1154.

18. Ibid. Vol. 43, pt. 1. p. 719.

19. Ibid. p. 881.

20. The total cost of the program, which included the construction of 27 destroyers and 23 submarines, was estimated at 58,000,000 pounds. Great Britain. Admiralty. *Programme of New Construction*. 1926. (Cmd. 2476)

not laid down and nine projected but not yet appropriated for.²¹ Of the British first line cruisers, only four have been built since the Washington Conference, while twenty-four were completed before or during 1918. In size these latter ships range from 3,750 to 4,650 tons each and are mounted with six-inch guns.

The United States had ten first line cruisers and twenty-two second line cruisers built. In addition, the United States had two 10,000-ton cruisers building and six authorized and appropriated for. While the first line cruisers were of 7,500 tons each, and built since the Washington Conference, the American second line cruisers were all built between 1895 and 1908.

Although inferior to Great Britain in cruisers, the United States occupied a position of superiority in regard to destroyers and submarines.

As an outgrowth of the disarmament work of the League of Nations, the League Council established a Preparatory Commission for a Disarmament Conference, composed of military and naval experts, which held three

sessions between May, 1926 and April, 1927. The United States accepted an invitation to participate in the work of the Commission, the purpose of which was not to reach an agreement as to the actual limitation of armaments but simply to define the terms and the methods by which a later conference might bring about limitation. In the course of the discussions, a division arose between one group of nations, led by France, and another group composed primarily of Great Britain, the United States and Japan, the first group taking the position that land, sea and air armaments are interdependent and that it would be impossible to agree upon the limitation of one type of armament without simultaneously limiting other types.²² Owing to the great practical difficulties of reaching a universal agreement in regard to all types of armaments, the United States feared that a deadlock had developed at Geneva, and that little progress through this channel could be made. Consequently President Coolidge hoped that an agreement could be reached between some of the states on the point that navies could be limited apart from armies and aircraft.

THE GENEVA NAVAL CONFERENCE

On February 10, President Coolidge invited Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan to negotiate, through their delegates to the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, an agreement for the limitation of those classes of naval vessels which had not been covered by the Washington Treaty. The American Government believed that at such a conference it would be possible to bring about an agreement in regard to navies while leaving to the future the limitation of other forms of armaments.

In a message to Congress of the same date, President Coolidge declared that competitive armaments "constitute one of the most dangerous contributing causes of international suspicion and discord and are calculated eventually to lead to war."²³

Both the French and Italian Governments

declined to participate in the Coolidge Conference. The French Government stated that such a conference would risk compromising the success of the disarmament work undertaken by the League of Nations. It believed that naval armaments could not be limited without taking into consideration land and air armaments. The Italian Government declined on the ground that because "of its unfavorable geographical position" it could not expose itself "without grave risks to a binding limitation of its armaments." Nevertheless both the Italian and French Governments sent observers to the Conference.

The British and the Japanese Governments accepted the American invitation, following which the date of the conference, thus limited to three governments, was finally fixed at June 20, 1927. Its meeting place was Geneva. The delegates were as follows:

21. These are the agreed figures presented to the Geneva Conference.

23. U. S. President. *Message, Limitation of Armament*. (69th Cong. 2nd Sess. H. doc. 70)

22. F. P. A. *Information Service*, Vol. III, No. 2, "Disarmament and the Five Naval Powers."

The United States: The Honorable Hugh Gibson, United States Ambassador to Belgium; Rear Admiral Hilary P. Jones, Chairman of the General Board of the Navy.

Great Britain: Rt. Hon. W. C. Bridgeman, First Lord of the Admiralty; Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster; Vice-Admiral Sir F. L. Field, Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff.

Japan: Admiral Viscount M. Saito, Governor-General, of Korea; Viscount K. Ishii, Japanese Ambassador to France.

Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, the Irish Free State and India also had delegates who, together with the British delegates, formed the British Empire Delegation. New Zealand was represented by Lord Jellicoe and Rear Admiral A. F. Beal. Each delegation also included a large number of naval advisers.

The Conference lasted from June 20 to August 4, 1927. It consisted of three plenary sessions, which were open to the public, and which were largely formal in nature. The bulk of the work, however, was done in committees and in informal meetings which were held in secret. A number of writers have stated that as a result of the secrecy with which the Geneva Conference was held, rumors and distorted statements appeared in the press which prejudiced a real settlement and kept the public in ignorance of the fundamental issues involved.²⁴

At the first plenary session the Hon. Hugh Gibson, head of the American delegation, was elected chairman of the Conference. In his address he stated that there was "assured agreement on the following points":

1. That in the interest of international understanding there should be no competition between the Three Powers in the building of naval armaments.
2. That our respective navies should be maintained at the lowest level compatible with national security and should never be of a size or character to warrant the suspicion of aggressive intent.
3. That a wise economy in Government dictates that future naval construction should be kept to a minimum.

4. That the methods and principles of limitation set forth in the Washington Treaty are both practical and effective and should be extended to all categories of combatant vessels of the Three Powers.

Subsequent discussion showed, however, that there was not complete agreement upon the application of these points, at least as far as the British and American delegations were concerned.

ORGANIZATION OF GENEVA CONFERENCE

The Conference organized itself into two committees—the Executive Committee composed of the chief delegates of the three governments, and the Technical Committee composed of naval experts. The latter committee undertook to agree upon the bases and methods of limitation and for this purpose held nine sessions during the first three weeks of the Conference. Vital differences between the American and British points of view first arose during the meetings of these experts. The Executive Committee of the Conference devoted two sessions to a discussion of the report of the Technical Committee. On July 14, the second plenary session was held at the request of the British delegation in order to dispel "gross misrepresentations of the British case in certain quarters, where ideas have been disseminated of serious ill-feeling amongst the various delegates, and an atmosphere of intolerance which makes any chance of agreement more difficult."²⁵

On July 20, the British Cabinet ordered the British delegation to return to London. On the 27th, Sir Austen Chamberlain delivered a speech in the House of Commons, attempting to do away with the "misunderstanding" as to the aims of the British Government.

Upon the return of the British delegation to Geneva on July 28, new efforts at a compromise were attempted but without result. On August 4, the third and final plenary session of the Conference was held, and adjournment took place without agreement.

24. Baker, P. J. N. *Disarmament and the Coolidge Conference*, p. 9. Scarborough's despatch to the *New York Herald-Tribune*, July 24, 1927.

25. Great Britain. Admiralty. *Speeches in Plenary Session of Geneva Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armaments by the Right Hon. W. C. Bridgeman*, 1927, p. 7. (Cmd. 2964.)

On August 25, Lord Cecil resigned from the British Cabinet because he disagreed with the broad policy of disarmament held by the majority of the Cabinet.²⁶

During the course of the Conference three important issues confronted the delegates:

1. The ratio of naval strength, that is, whether or not the United States and Great Britain should be on a parity with respect to auxiliary vessels, in a ratio of 5 to 3 with Japan.

2. Limitation within the total tonnage of different classes of ships, that is, whether any restriction should be placed on the number of 10,000-ton, eight-inch cruisers.

3. The amount of tonnage and the number of ships.

For the sake of clarity these issues are reviewed separately in the following summary, although they frequently overlapped in the discussions at Geneva.

I

THE QUESTION OF PARITY

The question of cruiser parity between the United States and Great Britain was the subject of considerable confusion within the Conference. In its invitation to the Coolidge Conference the American Government had proposed as a basis for discussion the extension of the 5-5-3 ratio to classes of vessels not covered by the Washington Treaty. Neither the British nor the Japanese Governments, however, had agreed to accept this as the basis of negotiation.²⁷

At the first plenary session Mr. Gibson suggested the adoption of the Washington ratio. In his opening statement, Mr. Bridgeman, the First Lord of the British Admiralty, avoided any reference to ratio, while stressing the special needs of England, whose position was "totally different from that of any other country in the world." This plea for special treatment, coupled with his silence in regard to the American proposal for parity, was widely interpreted in American circles to mean that the British Empire was not disposed to grant equality to the United States in cruisers.

The persistence of these rumors finally brought forth denials from the British delegation. In his address at the second plenary session of the Conference on July 14, 1927, Mr. Bridgeman denied that the British Government had any desire for supremacy. He stated that his government had already accepted parity with the United States in both

large and small cruisers, provided the number of large cruisers was limited. The British Government was not troubled about parity with America, but, he said, "It is our own security with which we are concerned . . ."

Despite these statements, some doubt remained as to the actual attitude of the British Government toward parity.²⁸

Mr. Bridgeman's announcement at Geneva in favor of parity was received with anxiety by members of the British Cabinet who telegraphed their dissatisfaction to the British delegation at Geneva. The Cabinet finally summoned the delegation home on July 20, despite the latter's fear that such a proceeding would endanger the success of the negotiations. Upon arrival in London, the British delegation found, to quote Lord Cecil, that "certain members of the Cabinet" thought that it would be most dangerous "to admit mathematical parity with the United States in auxiliary vessels." These Ministers clearly intimated that they preferred no agreement to one embodying that principle. In an attempt to meet the conflicting views the Cabinet decided that Sir Austen Chamberlain should state in Parliament that while there need be no difficulty in arriving at a temporary arrangement about the im-

26. The text of Lord Cecil's statement is printed in *The Times* (London) August 30, 1927. p. 10.

27. For their replies, see Foreign Policy Association. *Disarmament and the Five Naval Powers*. p. 18. (Information Service. Vol. III, No. 2.)

28. Mr. Bridgeman himself had declared in 1926, "there is always a little danger in talking about a one-power standard. That only exists in regard to battleships and ships of large size. It would be a very dangerous thing for Great Britain to allow it to be thought that we could be satisfied with a one-power standard in cruisers, for example. In cruisers we want to feel that we are at any rate superior to other countries and are able to protect our trade." Kawakami, K. K. *The Hidden Conflict at the Three-Power Naval Conference*. (Current History. October, 1927. p. 108.)

mediate future of cruiser building, the British Government could not give such an arrangement the appearance of an immutable principle, which might be treated as a precedent. This statement was made in the House of Commons on July 27, 1927. Lord Cecil objected to such a statement on the ground that it was unnecessary and likely to increase the difficulty of negotiations.²⁹

Following the return of the delegation to Geneva, the question of parity seemed to lose some of its political importance. But in a speech four days after the adjournment of the Conference, Mr. Winston Churchill, Chancellor of the Exchequer, after referring to the special needs of the Empire said, "Therefore, we are not able now—and I hope at no future time—to embody in a solemn international agreement any words which would bind us to the principle of mathematical parity in naval strength."³⁰ Thus, despite Mr. Bridgeman's acceptance of parity at Geneva, there seems to be a division of opinion within the present British Cabinet as to whether or not the British Government should agree to this mathematical parity in cruisers with the United States.

POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF PARITY ISSUE

The question of parity is of importance from the standpoint of the naval policy of the United States and of the political relations between the United States and Great Britain. The belief is strongly held by one section of British opinion that, because of the character of the British Empire, Great Britain needs a larger fleet than the United States. Should British communications be cut, it is argued, the British people would starve. While a similar blockade would injure the material interests of the United States to a certain extent, nevertheless, this group declares, the American people would not starve because of the relatively self-sufficient nature of the American continent.

This argument has not been accepted by the "Big Navy" group in the American Congress and by other people in the United

States. With the growing dependence of the United States upon foreign markets, and the increase of American foreign investments, the United States, in their opinion, needs as large a navy as any other power, not only to protect American interests in time of war, but also to defend our rights as neutrals—rights which, in the opinion of many, the British navy has not always respected in the past.

On the other hand, a leading journalist in the United States writes, "To my mind, the launching of the United States upon a program of naval equality with the supreme naval power, which is Britain, is an illustration of precisely the spirit which in other nations we scornfully denounce as imperialistic. Neither in American policy nor in American conditions do I see any necessity for such naval strength. Nor do I believe that for the mass of American people there is any real estimate of actual needs. The issue is purely one of prestige."³¹

COMPARATIVE NAVAL EXPENDITURES

According to tables compiled by the Foreign Policy Association and printed in the Appendix, the United States already expends more upon naval defense than does the British Empire as a whole. On the other hand, the foreign trade of the United Kingdom exceeded that of the United States by \$600,000,000 in 1926, while the total trade of the British Empire, which the British fleet is designed to protect, exceeded the foreign trade of the United States by approximately six billion dollars. From the per capita standpoint, the United States in 1926 expended one dollar upon naval expenditure for every \$27.63 in foreign trade; while the United Kingdom expended one dollar for every \$34.27 in foreign trade. Japan expended one dollar on the navy for every \$18.34 on foreign trade. In other words, naval expenditure in the United Kingdom is seven dollars per capita less, in relation to foreign trade, than in the United States. Japanese per capita expenditure in relation to per capita foreign trade is larger than in the other two countries.

29. Great Britain. House of Lords. *Debates*. Vol. 69, Col. 92. (Unrevised Edition.)

30. *The Times* (London). August 8, 1927. p. 12.

31. Simonds, F. H. *Thirteen Years After*. (American Review of Reviews. August, 1927. p. 166.)

II

THE QUESTION OF 10,000-TON CRUISERS

Much of the confusion over the question of whether or not Great Britain had accepted parity with the United States arose over the difficulty of defining what parity actually meant. Even if the tonnage of each navy should be fixed at the same figure, one country might use its tonnage in the construction of a few powerful vessels which in a contest could worst a much larger number of smaller vessels constructed by the other within the same tonnage total. Thus, even though mathematical parity might be attained, the use of tonnage in this manner might lead to the definite superiority of one, unless the other utilized its tonnage in the same way.

At the Conference Great Britain declared that it had no desire to construct many large cruisers, because the needs of the Empire demanded a large number of small cruisers. Accordingly, the British Government proposed that cruisers be divided into two categories, large and small, and that the large cruisers with eight-inch guns be limited to twelve each for the United States and Great Britain. While the United States finally agreed to discuss the limitation of 10,000-ton cruisers, it declined to discuss the limitation of vessels carrying eight-inch guns. There were several reasons for this disagreement.

At the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament, held under the auspices of the League of Nations, both the American and the British delegates had taken the ground that, for the reasons just given, navies could not be limited upon the basis of total tonnage but should be limited upon the basis of categories or of classes.

On April 5, 1927, Mr. Hugh Gibson, the American delegate, had argued as follows:

"The provision allowing each country to be free to distribute and arrange the total tonnage allowed to it, without providing in the agreement for the allocation of such tonnage, contains the germ of eventual competition. Such an application would not lessen international suspicion, uneasiness and mistrust; indeed, it is hard to imagine any system which would tend to create suspicion and mistrust more than secret building programs conceived and laid down under such loose conditions.

"We believe that the maximum size of each category should be prescribed, also the maximum calibre of gun, because we are convinced that we cannot go wrong if we deal with tangible and visible characteristics rather than complicate the problem by dealing with characteristics that are not openly visible to all the world that cares to see."³²

Previously the experts of the British Empire, the United States and Japan (and also Argentina and Chile) had agreed that the term "combatant vessels," should include capital ships, aircraft-carriers, cruisers (of all kinds), flotilla leaders, destroyers, submarines and such other special types as may be included in the agreement.³³ It should be observed that this classification did not attempt to divide cruisers into two categories.

In his opening address at the Geneva Conference, Mr. Gibson proposed that these categories be maintained, *i. e.*, that cruisers, destroyers and submarines should be subject to limitation by classes.³⁴

BRITISH PROPOSAL FOR TWO CLASSES OF CRUISERS

But the British delegation interjected a new element into the discussion. Instead of proposing a limitation by tonnage, it proposed that the cruisers should be divided into two classes, 10,000-ton eight-inch gun cruisers and 7,500-ton six-inch gun cruisers. In a subsequent proposal the British reduced the latter class to 6,000-ton cruisers, and proposed that the number of each class of cruisers should be fixed by agreement.

The argument advanced in favor of the distinction between these two types of cruisers and the limitation of each type was that the smaller cruisers could be used only for defensive purposes. The British claimed that a 10,000-ton cruiser had two and a half times the power of a 7,500 six-inch gun cruiser. It was the view of the British delegation that the demand of the American delegation for an unlimited number of 10,000-ton cruisers

32. League of Nations. Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference. *Minutes of the Third Session, March 21-April 26, 1927.* p. 172.

33. League of Nations. Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference. *Report of Sub-Commission A.*

34. He also proposed that a fourth category of negligible combatant vessels should not be subject to limitation.

— at one time the figure of twenty-five was mentioned—was a threat to the British Empire. With such a fleet the United States could drive the smaller British cruisers off the seas. The British asserted that any such proposal did not conform with Mr. Gibson's original statement that navies should be maintained at the lowest level compatible with national security and should never be of a size or character to warrant the suspicion of aggressive intent.

Consequently, if the United States were free to build what tonnage it liked within a given total, and if it actually built as many 10,000-ton cruisers as it liked, the British Government, obliged to use its tonnage in a large number of small cruisers, would find itself, not in a position of parity, but of actual inferiority.

UNITED STATES OPPOSE LIMITATION OF LARGE CRUISERS

In reply, the American delegation declared that a 10,000-ton cruiser has a much greater cruising radius than a smaller cruiser. The British Empire has naval bases throughout the world where its vessels may frequently re-fuel, but the United States has fewer naval bases, and consequently any restriction on the fuel-carrying capacity of its vessels would weaken the strength of the American navy. Moreover, it would be more expensive to build and maintain a large number of small ships than a small number of ships of larger tonnage. Mr. Gibson implied in the third plenary session that if the number of American cruisers carrying eight-inch guns were limited, the American navy would be at a disadvantage compared with armed British merchant ships in time of war.³⁵

The British merchant marine contains 888,000 tons of fast merchant vessels, including such ships as the *Majestic* and *Olympic*, in comparison with 188,000 tons for the United States, which in time of war might

be converted into cruisers and mounted with six-inch guns. It was the opinion of American naval officers—but an opinion that was not shared by British officers—that a fast liner thus armed could put up a strong fight against a six-inch gun cruiser. But it could not put up such a contest with a 10,000-ton eight-inch cruiser. The American delegates argued that any proposal to limit the number of 10,000-ton cruisers would remove this potential defense against British armed merchantmen, and thus place the United States in a position of real inferiority, in time of war.

In regard to this point, Mr. Hector C. Bywater declared that the importance of the British merchant marine had been greatly exaggerated.³⁶

"Speed is admittedly a *sine qua non* of cruiser efficiency . . . It is certain that no vessel slower than thirty knots can be considered efficient for the performance of cruiser functions . . . The two swiftest [British lines] (*Mauretania* and *Majestic*) can steam 26 knots. Then we have four cross-channel boats, each of only 3,460 tons gross, which can make 24 to 25 knots. Then there are two big liners (*Aquitania* and *Beren-garia*) and seven small cross-channel boats with speeds of 23 to 24 knots. These figures show the war potentiality of the British merchant marine, so far as cruiser duty is concerned, to have been exaggerated.

"That the general value of this marine for war purposes would be enormous cannot be denied, and it undoubtedly constitutes one of the pillars of British sea power. But it offers no substitute for regular cruiser tonnage. . . "

INCONSISTENCY CHARGED BY BOTH DELEGATIONS

The American delegation pointed out that it was inconsistent for the British Government to assert that the 10,000-ton cruiser was for offensive purposes, in view of the fact that the British Government was the first to start the construction of this type of cruiser following the Washington Conference. In the summer of 1927, the British Government had practically completed the construction of five such cruisers and had six more laid down. Moreover, it had four vessels of 9,750 tons each already in commission. In comparison with these fifteen vessels, the United States had only two

35. Article XIV of the Washington Naval Treaty says: "No preparations shall be made in merchant ships in time of peace for the installation of warlike armaments for the purpose of converting such ships into vessels of war, other than the necessary stiffening of decks for the mounting of guns not exceeding 6-inch (152 millimetres) calibre."

According to Article XXII of the Treaty, whenever any party becomes engaged in war, it may after notice suspend its obligations under the Treaty for the period of hostilities.

For a discussion of the whole question of the legality of arming merchant ships, see Hyde, C. C. *International Law*. 1922. Vol. II, p. 402-5, 466-72.

36. *Baltimore Sun*, August 11, 1927.

10,000-ton cruisers about 15 per cent completed and six more for which contracts had just been let. None of these American cruisers will be completed before two years.

What was even more inconsistent, in the eyes of the American delegates, was the proposal brought back from London by the British delegation on July 28, in favor of a total global tonnage allocated, with certain exceptions, as each government saw fit. This seemed to be an abandonment of the principle of limitation by category for which the British had struggled so persistently.

When the American delegation declined to limit the number of 10,000-ton cruisers the British implied that the United States delegation had abandoned the stand taken during the Preparatory Commission when it advocated limitation by classes. But the American experts, while agreeing to this principle, had not agreed to the division of cruisers into two classes, but, along with the British experts, had placed cruisers of *all classes* into one category. Technically, the American position at the Coolidge Conference was consistent with its position at the League Commission. On the other hand, if the contention was correct that there was as much difference between a 10,000-ton cruiser and a 6,000-ton cruiser as between a battleship and a 10,000-ton cruiser, the arguments for placing the latter in a category by themselves would appear as sound as the general argument for limitation by categories, to which the American delegation had subscribed.

CONFERENCE BREAKS ON ISSUE OF EIGHT-INCH GUNS

Toward the end of the Conference, the American delegation finally agreed to discuss the number of 10,000-ton cruisers and to accept a secondary class of cruisers, provided that the secondary type should not be of a maximum individual displacement which would preclude the mounting of eight-inch guns. But it does not appear that the two delegations could agree upon the number of 10,000-ton cruisers, to which each government should be entitled. At one time the American delegation suggested eighteen such cruisers and at another time twenty-five—

a figure which caused alarm in the British delegation. Upon their return from London on July 28, the British delegation proposed that the number of 10,000-ton cruisers be limited to twelve each for Great Britain and the United States and to eight for Japan. It proposed that the size of other cruisers be limited to 6,000 tons and to six-inch guns.³⁷

The American delegation rejected both proposals.³⁸ It apparently wished more than twelve large cruisers within the total tonnage which it had proposed, and it wished to be free to mount all of its cruisers with eight-inch guns, for the reasons mentioned above.

In a final effort to meet the argument that the unlimited construction of 10,000-ton cruisers would be a menace to British security, the American delegation suggested the insertion of a "safeguard" clause in the treaty providing that, if the building program of any one of the powers within the total tonnage limitation agreed upon should give concern to any other power, a meeting of the powers might be called any time after 1931, and if a satisfactory agreement could not be reached in such a conference, the treaty might be terminated within a year. But this proposal did not meet British approval—apparently on the ground that it would not remove the feeling of insecurity which the unlimited construction of 10,000-ton cruisers would create. Thus the Conference deadlocked; the United States stood firm in its demand for the eight-inch gun just as the British stood firm, as will be seen, for a tonnage which would enable it to maintain seventy cruisers.

In a speech in the House of Lords, Viscount Cecil later said that it was "madness" to allow the negotiations to break down by insisting on the eight-inch gun; it was evident to him that "such a decision could only be come to by men who took a very different view of the importance of an agreement with

37. Certain exceptions were made in the case of the United States which could retain 10 cruisers of the Omaha class and which could build 8-inch gun cruisers, falling neither within the 10,000 ton or 6,000 ton class, which, in the opinion of the Naval Advisers of the three delegations, would equalize the strength of the British Empire and the United States in this class. The British Empire could also retain 4 Hawkins class, and three other vessels; while Japan could retain four cruisers of the Iika class.

38. It rejected these proposals also because they were coupled with a general plan calling for a larger tonnage than the United States felt justified in accepting.

the United States on this matter from that which he did."³⁹ Mr. Bywater writing on this point said, "No harm would have been

done to British interests by accepting the eight-inch guns for small cruisers, and I think it was a mistake to oppose this claim."

III

THE QUESTION OF TONNAGE LEVELS

Difficulties arose, not only on the question of parity and the eight-inch gun, but also on the amount of tonnage which each government should have. At the first session of the Conference, the American Government proposed a maximum total tonnage in auxiliary craft of 640,000 tons for the British Government and the United States, of which 300,000 tons should be for cruisers.⁴⁰

On July 8, the British delegation announced that it required a total tonnage of 875,000 tons, while on July 28 it stated that its needs could be reduced to 737,000 tons.⁴¹

While it thus reduced its tonnage, the British delegation did not name a figure which the American delegation felt that it could accept. Moreover, the British delegation never swerved from insisting upon the right to maintain seventy cruisers. The adoption of the American proposal would have limited the number of cruisers in the British and the American navies to about forty, the exact number depending upon the tonnage of each ship.

GREAT BRITAIN'S DEMAND FOR SEVENTY CRUISERS

Perhaps the most forceful statement of British cruiser needs was made at the second plenary session by Lord Jellicoe, Admiral of the Fleet, and a representative of New Zealand at the Conference. He said in part:

"Our insistence upon numbers is the result of a consideration of the number and length of the sea communications of the Empire which need protection and the great volume of trade along these communications. Much of this trade being foodstuffs it is absolutely essential to the actual life of the people of Great Britain. A great proportion of the remainder is necessary for the economic welfare of the people of Great Britain and the outlying parts of the Empire.

³⁹ Great Britain. House of Lords. *Debates*. Vol. 69. Col. 92. (Unrevised edition)

⁴⁰ The original Japanese proposal was made that none of the Powers should adopt new building programmes; but replacements could be made to keep up naval strength. It would seem that the adoption of this proposal would as far as cruisers are concerned, have given to Japan a position approaching equality with the United States, rather than a ratio of 5:3.

⁴¹ *The New York Times*, July 9, July 30, 1927.

"The length of the principal lines of communication on which British vessels are to be found in large numbers is approximately 80,000 miles, and on April 1, 1926 (a typical day) 9,500,000 tons of British ships exceeding 3,000 tons in individual tonnage were actually on those lines or were within areas at the terminals of the lines and approaching various ports.

"If we analyze these lines of communication and consider them in different areas, which might be looked upon respectively as spheres in which protective vessels might be operating, we find that in the North Atlantic there were 3,000,000 tons of British shipping disposed along lines 13,000 miles in length. In the South Atlantic, 1,280,000 tons along lines 6,300 miles in length. In the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal, 1,147,000 along lines 20,000 miles in length. In the Pacific, 642,000 tons along lines 26,000 miles in length and in the Mediterranean 607,000 tons along lines 1,100 miles in length. The tonnage necessary to complete the total of 9½ million tons mostly represents ships approaching the terminals.

"It is, of course, possible that under certain conditions shipping in one or more of these areas might be fairly safe from interruption by hostile vessels; but when the operations of the two German raiders *Wolf* and *See Adler* in the Pacific, the Indian Ocean and other seas, many thousands of miles distant from German ports, are considered, it will be realized that it may well be necessary to look upon the great majority of the Empire's lines of communication as open to attack.

"Perhaps it may be argued that the number of cruisers which the British Empire desires to possess is too great, and doubts may be expressed by other nations as to the necessity for this number . . . It is surely obvious . . . that each nation must judge for herself as to the measures necessary for her own safety; and, as has been pointed out very frequently, the British Empire, with its far-flung Dominions and the absolute dependence of the British people for food on sea communication, occupies a totally different position in this respect from any other nation in the world.

"The requirements of the Empire today have been given as some 70 cruisers. This number is arrived at as follows: It is the generally ac-

cepted view that in a fleet 5 cruisers are required for every 3 capital ships. With the British fleet of 15 capital ships, the number of cruisers needed for fleet work is therefore 25, and 45 out of a total of 70 are therefore left for direct trade protection. Of this number we must expect 12 to be refitting or fuelling at any given moment. With lines of communication 80,000 miles in length, this gives one cruiser for every 2,500 miles of communication. Naturally, cruisers are not dotted about the ocean singly in this way, but are engaged in convoy work patrolling in groups or squadrons, or are held available in various strategic or focal centers; but the figures indicate that the British Empire Delegation would find it very difficult to agree to a reduction in the number of cruisers, for which we are pressing, in view of our responsibilities to the Mother Country and to the Dominions overseas."

He claimed that, in view of British experience during the World War, 70 cruisers would not be excessive. At the outbreak of the World War the British Empire possessed 114 cruisers. But in spite of the fact that Germany had only two armored cruisers, six light cruisers and four armed auxiliaries outside of the North Sea, British losses in merchant ships due to the action of these German vessels exceeded 220,000 tons. For the purpose of watching the North Sea, the British navy stationed 30 cruisers and 24 armed merchant vessels outside of the North Sea. But despite this force over 50 per cent of the German raiders leaving a German port to attack British trade escaped detection. Lord Jellicoe cited the damages done by the German ships, *Berlin* and *Emden*.

Upon the basis of this reasoning the British delegation adhered throughout the Conference to its demand for seventy cruisers. But it has been pointed out that if 114 cruisers proved inadequate for British needs during the last war, the British Government in the future should plan to maintain not seventy cruisers but an infinitely larger number, calculated to be able to meet the enemy's attack. It was argued that instead of attempting to build against unknown enemies, greater security could be obtained by an agreement limiting the number of cruisers of potential enemies.⁴²

42. Baker, P. J. N. *Disarmament and the Coolidge Conference*.

UNITED STATES OPPOSES BRITISH DEMAND

For a number of reasons, the United States opposed the British demand for seventy cruisers. To achieve parity with Great Britain upon this basis the United States would have been obliged to construct about thirty new cruisers, in addition to those built and authorized, which would have cost the people of the United States somewhere between \$450,000,000 and \$500,000,000 in this class alone. The American delegation apparently believed that a fleet of seventy small cruisers could be offensively dangerous to the interests of the United States. Such a fleet would be even more effective in interfering with neutral commerce in time of war than was the British fleet during the World War.

At the Washington Conference, the American Government had proposed a cruiser and destroyer limitation of 450,000 tons which the British delegation, it was understood by the United States, accepted. Mr. Gibson asked at Geneva, "What has brought about this change on the part of the British Government? What new factor in world affairs has appeared upon the horizon which has caused them misapprehension?" Following this statement, Lord Balfour, who had been the chief delegate at Washington, denied that he had accepted the figure of 450,000 tons for a total cruiser tonnage.⁴³ But a careful reading of the Minutes of the Conference, in their setting, would indicate that his words are susceptible of two interpretations.⁴⁴

43. *The Times*, (London) August 8, 1927. p. 12.

44. In reply to Mr. Hughes' proposal for the establishment of a 5-5-3 ratio for all types of ships, and fixing tonnage for capital ships at 500,000 tons and for cruisers and destroyers at 450,000, Mr. Balfour stated, "It does deal with the three greatest fleets of the world, and in the broad spirit in which it deals with these fleets, in proportion of disarmament which it lays down for those fleets, the Government of the country which I represent is in the fullest and the heartiest sympathy with the policy which the United States have brought before us for our consideration. (Applause.) They have, as we think most rightly, taken the battle fleet as the aggressive unit which they have in the main to consider; and in the battle fleet you must include those auxiliary ships without which a modern battle fleet has neither eyes nor ears, has little power of defense against certain forms of attack, and little power of observation; little power of dealing with any equal foe to which it may be opposed.

"Taking those two as really belonging to one subject, namely the battle fleet, taking those two, the battleships, themselves and the vessels auxiliary and necessary to a battle fleet, we think that the proportion between the various countries is acceptable; we think the limitation of amounts is reasonable; we think it should be accepted; we firmly believe that it will be accepted." Conference on the Limitation of Armament, Washington, 1921/22. [*Minutes*]. p. 101.

In an effort to break the deadlock over tonnage, the American delegation, at a secret meeting of the Technical Committee on July 6, agreed to raise the cruiser tonnage to 400,000 tons for Great Britain and the United States. This figure was 100,000 tons larger than that originally proposed by the United States.

Nothing came of this, however, apparently because of the opposition of the Japanese delegation—who complained that the plan would oblige Japan to make large additions to its navy when it simply wished to maintain the *status quo*.⁴⁵ In an effort to bring the question to a head, the British delegation proposed a plenary session for July 11. But still hoping for agreement, the other delegations attempted to postpone this session. An opportunity came with the assassination in Ireland of Kevin O'Higgins, Vice-President of the Executive Council of the Irish Free State and Irish delegate to the Conference. As a result the plenary session was postponed for three days, during which efforts to obtain an agreement were strenuously but unsuccessfully made. When the session was held on July 14, Mr. Gibson stated that the United States was in close agreement with Japan, and that if some agreement between the British and the Japanese could be found, it might be possible to make an agreement between all three governments.

NO AGREEMENT REACHED ON FINAL PROPOSALS

Negotiations took place between the British and Japanese and, following a trip to London, the British delegation made a new proposal on July 28. The combined total tonnage of cruisers, destroyers and submarines below the age-limit for replacement should not exceed 590,000 tons for the United States and Great Britain, and 385,000 tons for Japan. In addition each power might retain twenty-five per cent of the total tonnage in vessels over age.

This plan would have given the British Empire a tonnage of 590,000 tons plus

147,000 tons of over-age vessels—or a total of 737,000 tons in comparison with the maximum figure of 640,000 tons originally proposed by the American delegation. Having freedom to allocate this tonnage the British believed they could still maintain 70 small cruisers within the limitation of 737,000 tons for all auxiliary craft. The plan was rejected by the American delegation which did not wish to give treaty sanction to a navy of this size. Moreover, the American delegation felt that the provision for the retention of over-age cruisers would work to British advantage, since England's oldest cruisers were built in 1911 while many of the American second-line cruisers were built more than 20 years ago.

As a final effort, the Japanese proposed a naval holiday under which, until 1931, neither Great Britain nor Japan would build any large cruisers beyond those already authorized, but the United States could continue construction until it had reached parity with England. It was estimated that this proposal would authorize a cruiser tonnage by the United States and Great Britain of 458,000 tons which was 158,000 tons more than the original figure proposed by the United States.

This plan was also rejected by the United States, not only because the total tonnage limitation was in excess of the American figure but because the proposal would oblige the United States to limit its eight-inch gun cruisers.

BRITISH PROPOSAL FOR CAPITAL SHIP REDUCTION

While the British delegation stood out for a large number of cruisers and a correspondingly large tonnage, it did propose at the first plenary session to cut down the maximum tonnage of capital ships, from 35,000, as provided in the Washington Treaty, to "something under 30,000 tons." It also proposed to reduce the size of guns from 16 inches to 13.5 inches and to extend the life of capital ships from 20 to 26 years. It proposed similar reductions in the size and gun calibre of aircraft carriers, destroyers, submarines and cruisers

⁴⁵ Cf. Kwakami, K. K. *The Hidden Conflict at the Three-Power Naval Conference*. (Current History. October, 1927. p. 105.)

and the extension of the life of these same vessels.⁴⁶

The effect of the adoption of the British proposals would have been to reduce the cost of constructing individual vessels and also replacement cost because of the extension of the life of vessels. According to Mr. Bridgeman, the adoption of this proposal would save the British Empire £50,000,000 during the next ten years. An English writer points out, however, that this saving of £50,000,000, which would start only after 1931, and which would be spread over a period of ten to twelve years would thus be reduced to an average annual saving of perhaps £4,500,000. Furthermore it would be offset by annual charges for the construction and maintenance of a larger number of cruisers than would have been constructed under the American plan. Even omitting all consideration of these offsetting factors, an annual saving of £4,500,000 would be less than 4 per cent of the annual sum which Great Britain now spends on naval and military armaments.⁴⁷

The American delegation apparently did not believe that the British proposal, considered in connection with the demand for 70 cruisers, could lead to any real economy. On the other hand, it believed that the reduction of the size of capital ships would weaken the strategic value of the American fleet, which is already handi-

capped by the absence of naval bases. The British Government had just completed the construction of the *Rodney* and *Nelson*, with a displacement of 35,000 tons each, and which are not to be replaced under the Washington Treaty until 1942, in comparison with ordinary vessels the replacement of which may commence in 1931. Any proposal to reduce capital ship tonnage to 30,000 upon replacement would still further increase the relative superiority of the British vessels, according to the United States. The American delegation further pointed out that the extension of the life of capital ships would also work to British advantage. Ship to ship, the British capital ships are of a newer type than the American vessels and if the date of replacement should be postponed the British fleet would enjoy an increasing advantage because of the obsolescence of American vessels. The American delegation also took the position that the Geneva Conference was not competent to discuss the size of battleships because these matters had been settled in the Washington Treaty and should be considered only in accordance with the provisions of that treaty.

The three delegations finally agreed that they would recommend to their respective governments the desirability of holding a conference after August, 1937, as authorized in Article 21 of the Washington Naval Treaty, to consider what changes, if any, in the treaty may be necessary.

FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE FAILURE

From the foregoing summary of the negotiations at Geneva, the failure of the Conference appears to have been due to America's insistence upon retaining complete freedom to mount large or small cruisers with eight-inch guns and to Great Britain's insistence upon an absolute minimum of seventy

cruisers. At the conclusion of the Conference each delegation attempted to place the entire responsibility for the break-down on the other.

Aside from these major technical differences, other reasons for the failure have been advanced by American and British observers. One factor which has been widely commented upon was the fundamentally different concept of naval requirements. Throughout the Conference the British delegation argued that Britain's naval needs are "absolute" while the American delegation declared that all naval requirements are "relative," a fact which was recognized, ac-

46. Mr. Bridgeman's proposals were as follows: fixing of the life of (a) 8-inch gun cruisers at 24 years; (b) destroyers at 20 years; (c) submarines at 15 years; limitation of the displacement of aircraft carriers to 25,000 tons instead of the present limit of 27,000 tons; reduction of guns on aircraft carriers from 8-inch to 6-inch; limitation of displacement of destroyer leaders to 1,750 tons and of destroyers to 1,400 tons. Guns on destroyers to be limited to 5-inch. With regard to submarines, the British Government had not changed its mind since the Washington Conference, when it expressed its willingness to discontinue their use.

47. Baker, P. J. N. *Disarmament and the Coolidge Conference*, p. 28.

cording to Mr. Gibson, in the Washington Naval Treaty. The American delegation further maintained that if naval needs were not relative, international agreement was impossible. At the third plenary session, Mr. Gibson had said that, "if we assume that naval needs are absolute, each country must be the sole judge of its naval needs, which cannot then be subject to reduction by agreement with other powers."

THE CHARGE OF INADEQUATE PREPARATION

Several Americans, notably Vice-President Dawes, and a number of Englishmen, including former Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald, have suggested that inadequate preparations for the Conference were responsible in part for the final failure. Speaking at Niagara Falls on August 7, Vice-President Dawes said, "Perhaps, before this Conference was held, there was not the preliminary careful appraisal by each conferee of the necessities of the other; perhaps too exclusive concentration by each conferee upon the necessities of his own nation resulted in a pre-determined ultimatum before a comparison of views; perhaps the public announcement of respective programs early in the Conference produced fears of domestic public repercussion if they were reasonably modified as would be necessary to effect an agreement."⁴⁸

On November 24, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald moved a vote of censure against the Baldwin Government as follows: "That the House deplores the lack of preparation by the Government and the military character of the British delegation, which seriously contributed to the failure of the recent Naval Conference at Geneva."⁴⁹ The motion, however, was rejected.

These charges of inadequate preparation were denied by the State Department, which declared that, during the meetings of the Preparatory Commission of the League, representatives of Great Britain, the United States and Japan had discussed and gradually worked out a set of common principles upon which it supposed an agreement could

be concluded. Nevertheless, the nature of the discussion at the Coolidge Conference indicates that no clear cut agreement was achieved at the Preparatory Commission as to the exact meaning of limitation by category. Several writers have pointed out that if the three governments had come to an understanding prior to the Conference as to whether eight-inch gun cruisers as such could be limited, and if they had come to an agreement on the question of parity, the attention of the Conference and of public opinion could have been focussed upon the important political question of tonnage levels and the number of ships.⁵⁰

THE POSSIBLE EXISTENCE OF WAR

A third factor, frequently noted by correspondents following the Conference, was the underlying feeling that a future war between the United States and Great Britain, while not probable, was possible. In an address to the House of Commons on July 11, Sir Austen Chamberlain, the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, stated that war between the United States and England was already outlawed in the hearts of the English people.⁵¹ Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that both delegations at Geneva seemed to premise their naval calculations on the possible existence of war in the future either between Great Britain and the United States, or between Great Britain and a third state, which would threaten the rights of the United States as a neutral. The Washington Conference showed that it was difficult to bring about a limitation of armaments without providing for the peaceful settlement of disputes between nations. It was only after negotiating the Four-Power Treaty in

50. In the House of Commons, Sir Austen Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, declared, "After the event, I say frankly that I take some blame for myself that we did not try to secure a further diplomatic preparation. But it should be remembered that we did not summon this conference; it was not called on our invitation. . . I had to consider whether I should say to the United States Government at that moment: 'Would it not be well, before you make this proposal to us formally, to consider upon what basis the conference should meet and whether there is such a measure of general agreement as would be likely to make the conference fruitful?' If His Majesty's Government refrained, it was lest they should appear in the eyes of the American Government to be seeking to evade acceptance of the invitation, and to appear to other people as seeming to be opposed to such an effort to further limit naval armaments. That is the only reason why this diplomatic preparation was not made, and I think it is a lesson of that conference that such diplomatic preparation is always desirable before a conference is begun." *The Times* (London) November 26, 1927. p. 8.

51. *The Times* (London) July 12, 1927. p. 8.

48. *New York Times*, August 8, 1927, p. 1.

49. *The Times*, (London), November 26, 1927. p. 8.

regard to the Pacific, and bringing to an end the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, that naval limitation proved possible. At the Coolidge Conference it was the belief of a number of observers, and apparently of the Japanese delegation, that if the Conference was to succeed, some consideration should be paid to these political questions. It is reported that the Japanese delegation brought a "security pact" with them to Geneva, but that it was not presented when the Japanese learned the temper of the other two delegations.⁵²

THE QUESTION OF NEUTRAL RIGHTS

While the question was not openly discussed at the Geneva Conference there is reason to believe that the stand of the American delegation was influenced by the treatment which American commerce has received from the British navy in time of war. During the first three years of the World War, a period in which the United States was a neutral, British cruisers in many cases stopped and otherwise interfered with American shipping which England believed to be indirectly destined for enemy ports, in violation, according to the United States, of principles of international law. The American delegation at Geneva apparently was of the opinion that a British navy having seventy small cruisers could enforce a blockade more effectively than in the past, while the British delegation seemed to believe that the United States wished an unlimited number of eight-inch gun cruisers to prohibit interferences of this nature in the future.⁵³

Two schools of thought have developed in England in regard to this question. One school favors making concessions to the American demand in favor of the exemption of private property from capture at sea in time of war. Another school, interested in increasing the sanctions of the League of Nations, favors the abolition of all neutral

rights, which seems to have been already accomplished for members of the League by Article 16 of the Covenant. This article obligates "members of the League to prevent all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the Covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not." If this provision is ever enforced, it may strike directly at the trade between the United States and the Covenant-breaking State. This whole question of the political relationship of the United States to Europe upon which the size of the navies will depend involves so many intricate aspects that it will not be discussed here but in a subsequent *Information Service* report.

PUBLIC OPINION IN GREAT BRITAIN

Public opinion, as expressed in the press of Great Britain and the United States, did not appear to accept with any unanimity the explanations for the failure advanced by the two delegations. While the Conservative press in Great Britain was inclined to blame the United States for the failure, a very large section of the Liberal press expressed open disfavor at the break-down.

The opinion of a section of the Liberal press was expressed by the *Manchester Guardian Weekly* of Friday, August 12:⁵⁴

"... It is difficult to imagine a debate on great matters worse conducted than this has been. It has been pettifogging in spirit, involved in argument, overloaded with unimportant details, and totally lacking in grasp of the general principles which should govern the relations of the two nations. What conception did our negotiators form of the real task before them and on what principal did they propose to negotiate? Did we approach the question of disarmament as friends or as competitors? Did we, on either side, look upon war between the two countries as an ordinary risk, to be provided against like all other known and recognized risks, or did we each of us exclude this particular risk as too remote to enter into any reasonable calculation? ... Did they even put these questions to themselves, let alone answer them? The blame does not rest on one party only to the negotiations; so far as we can judge it rests in about equal measure on both. ..."

52. Message from the *Kokumin* correspondent in *The New York Times*, June 23, 1927. Cf. Statement of Viscount Saito in *The Trans-Pacific*, October 8, 1927. p. 16.

53. In a speech before the Conference, Mr. Bridgeman declared, "I will never be a party to a policy which leaves us in any anxiety as to whether we are able to maintain the freedom of the seas." *The Times* (London) March 26, 1927. p. 14.

54. *Manchester Guardian*, August 12, 1927.

AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION

Editorial opinion in the American press was considerably divided as to the results of the Conference. A survey made during August of editorials in 119 leading newspapers from all parts of the country, showed that newspapers supporting the Administration, comprising roughly 50 per cent of the total survey, were in general against an increase in the American Navy as a result of the Geneva failure. The prevailing view in these papers was that a naval armament race would not and should not result from the failure. While a number of these papers were inclined to lay the blame for the collapse of negotiations at Great Britain's door, they expressed little bitterness toward Great Britain and advanced many other reasons for the failure.

Of newspapers critical of the Administration, a majority warned that the failure of the Conference would be used as a weapon by the "Big Navy" group in Congress. These papers also charged that the preparation for the Conference was inadequate, that it was impossible to accomplish anything in the absence of France and Italy, and argued that direct negotiation between governments is preferable to such conferences.

Newspapers advocating a substantial increase in the navy comprised roughly 30 per cent of the total included in the survey. A majority of these papers felt that the failure of the Conference would bring home to the American people the realization that our navy should at least equal that of Britain.

In Japan, immediately following his return from Geneva, Admiral Saito stated in a personal interview, that he was prepared to recommend that the Japanese Government summon a second Three-Power Naval Conference as soon as practicable.⁵⁵ The Tokyo Government, however, while inclined to be sympathetic, stated the next day that it had not considered the matter and would make no move unless there was reason to expect a favorable response.

55. *New York Times*, September 27, 1927; September 28, 1927.

GREAT BRITAIN'S BUILDING PROGRAM

The failure of the Conference has not resulted in any increased building program in Great Britain. Following the resignation of Lord Cecil from the Cabinet, the British Prime Minister announced that, in view of recent developments, the British Government would lay down only one of the three cruisers authorized by Parliament to be laid down in the forthcoming year.

The British program was explained by Mr. Bridgeman, in answer to questions in Parliament on November 23, as follows:

"Eleven 10,000-ton cruisers are now building for the Royal Navy. Our published program does not extend beyond 1929. It provides for one 10,000 tonner and two smaller ones in 1927, 1928, and 1929. A new situation, however, has arisen owing to the fact that at Geneva, although our proposal for the limitation of the number of 10,000 tonners was not agreed to, the discussions led to the hope that limitation may be reached.

"In these circumstances his Majesty's Government is reluctant to lay down any more large cruisers. We have dropped two ships from the program this year, one large and one small, and are considering substituting a smaller vessel for the 10,000 tonner in next year's program."⁵⁶

The naval correspondent of the *London Morning Post*, writing on November 24, said:

"The First Lord's statement means that this year's cruiser programme has been cut down from one "A" class ship of 10,000 tons and two "B" class ships of 8,000 tons each to a single "B" class cruiser, which will be laid down at Devonport at the beginning of next year.

"That means that we can demonstrate to the world a desire to reduce our armaments and hope that others will do the same, and that the Chancellor of the Exchequer can pride himself on a temporary saving of some three and one-half to four millions, spread over the next three years.

"Whether a permanent and not a temporary saving is made must depend entirely on what the other people do."⁵⁷

PRESIDENT COOLIDGE'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS

In his message to Congress of December 6, 1927, President Coolidge made the following statement:

"The country has put away the Old World policy of competitive armaments. It can never

56. *New York Times*, November 24, 1927.

57. *Morning Post*, (London), November 24, 1927.

be relieved of the responsibility of adequate national defense. . . .

"We were granted much cooperation by Japan, but we were unable to come to an agreement with Great Britain. While the results of the conference were of considerable value, they were mostly of a negative character. We know now that no agreement can be reached which will be inconsistent with a considerable building program on our part. We are ready and willing to continue the preparatory investigations on the general subject of limitation of armaments which have been started under the auspices of the League of Nations.

"We have a considerable cruiser tonnage, but a part of it is obsolete. Every one knew that had a three-power agreement been reached it would have left us with the necessity of continuing our building program. The failure to agree should not cause us to build either more or less than we otherwise should. Any future treaty of limitation will call on us for more ships. We should enter on no competition. We should refrain from no needful program. It should be made clear to all the world that lacking a definite agreement, the attitude of any other country is not to be permitted to alter our own policy.

"It should especially be demonstrated that propaganda will not cause us to change our course. Where there is no treaty limitation, the size of the navy which America is to have will be solely for America to determine. No outside influence should enlarge it or diminish it. But it should be known to all that our military power holds no threat of aggrandizement. It is a guaranty of peace and security at home, and when it goes abroad it is an instrument for the protection of the legal rights of our citizens under international law, a refuge in time of disorder, and always the servant of world peace. Wherever our flag goes, the rights of humanity increase."

UNITED STATES NAVAL BUILDING PROGRAM

In the United States a naval building program calling for new construction at a minimum cost of \$725,000,000, was presented in the House of Representatives, December 14, by Chairman Butler of the Committee on Naval Affairs. In submitting the program to Speaker Longworth, Secretary Wilbur, in a letter, pointed out that if enacted the Bill would authorize the President to undertake the construction of twenty-five cruisers at an estimated total cost of \$425,000,000; nine destroyer leaders to cost \$45,000,000; thirty-

two submarines at a cost of \$160,000,000; five aircraft carriers aggregating \$45,000,000. The Bill reads as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That for the purpose of further increasing the Naval Establishment of the United States the President of the United States is hereby authorized to undertake the construction of the following vessels: Twenty-five light cruisers, nine destroyer leaders, thirty-two submarines, and five aircraft carriers.

Sec. 2. The construction of light cruisers and aircraft carriers herein authorized shall be subject to the limitations prescribed by the treaty limiting naval armament, ratified August, 17, 1923.

Sec. 3. In the event of an international conference for the limitation of naval armament, the President is hereby empowered, in his discretion, to suspend in whole or in part any construction authorized by this act.

President Coolidge, it was officially announced, has given his approval to this proposal, which, it was stated in his behalf, does not conflict with the financial policies of the Administration.

What action will be taken on this program during the present session of Congress it is impossible to say. The Bill does not set any time limit. Competent observers declare that there is a prevailing sentiment in both the House and the Senate in favor of the Bill. At the same time, Representative French of Idaho, Chairman of the Naval Sub-Committee of the Appropriations Committee, expressed the view that the naval building program outlined by Secretary Wilbur was wholly out of line with the present and prospective needs of the navy. He expressed a doubt that Congress at this session would make appropriations for cruiser construction in addition to the eight 10,000-ton cruisers now under construction or appropriated for. The increase in construction funds for these eight cruisers would be somewhere between \$30,000,000 and \$40,000,000. Mr. French added that he felt that the Navy needed more cruisers than those now under construction, but he was inclined to think that a program of three years would come much closer to the Navy's actual needs than one of five or six per year which he considered excessive.

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APPENDIX I

The tables included in this appendix present data relating to several questions which were under discussion during the course of the negotiations at Geneva, such as the comparative value of American, British and Japanese foreign trade, merchant marine tonnage, comparative budget appropriations, etc.

In submitting figures with respect to comparative budget appropriations for naval defense and a comparison of per capita foreign trade and naval expenditures, it is recognized that the difference in price levels between the several countries detracts considerably from their value. The wages paid in the United States Navy, for example, and the costs of construction and repair are necessarily higher than those of other countries.

TOTAL FOREIGN TRADE¹

(In thousands of dollars)

	1922	1923	1924	1925	1926
BRITISH EMPIRE					15,007,437 ²
United Kingdom ..	8,088,989	9,067,430	9,789,609	10,816,841	9,835,937 ³
Australia	1,099,533	1,129,421	1,113,662	1,468,626	1,465,948 ⁴
Canada	1,621,713	1,880,291	1,842,543	2,161,254	2,282,549 ⁴
India	1,497,479	1,723,746	1,947,714	2,256,120	3,048,377 ⁵
New Zealand	340,853	405,062	443,524	517,352	463,454 ⁶
Union of S. Africa ..	346,255	418,915	430,060	524,062	770,742 ⁷
JAPAN	1,687,296	1,666,439	1,754,691	2,001,844	2,194,367 ⁸
UNITED STATES ..	6,944,524	7,959,559	8,200,947	9,136,437	9,239,548 ⁹

1. U. S. Commerce Year Book, 1925, unless otherwise indicated.

2. No figures are available for the total trade of the British Empire. The figure here used is an estimate compiled for the most part from British Colonial Office reports and other official reports for 1926. The total trade of the Oversea Dominions, Protectorates and Colonies is approximately eleven and a half billion dollars. Of this, however, only 45 per cent represents trade with countries other than members of the British Empire. Therefore, only \$5,171,500,000 has been added to the known figure for the United Kingdom to make the total loss for the British Empire. The above percentage is based on figures for the five-year period, 1919-23, contained in the *Statistical Abstract for the several British Overseas Dominions and Protectorates*, 1909-23, n. 57, pp. 42 and 50.

3. Great Britain. *Trade and Navigation of the United Kingdom*, Oct. 1927.

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5. India. *Sea-Borne Trade and Navigation of British India*, March, 1927.

6. New Zealand. *Trade and Shipping*, 1926. pt. II.

7. British South Africa. *Trade of the Union of South Africa*. . . 1927.

8. Japan. Dept. of Finance. *Foreign Trade of the Empire of Japan*, Dec. 1926.

9. U. S. Statistical Abstract. 1926. According to Brassey's Annual for 1928, 32.7% of the total value of U. S. foreign trade in 1926 was carried by American vessels.

MERCHANT MARINE TONNAGE*

(Gross tonnage of ships of 1,000 tons and above.)

Country	June, 1926 ¹	June, 1927 ¹	July, 1927 ²
Great Britain	21,564,000	21,437,000	650,000
United States	11,111,000	10,936,000	2,904,000
Japan	3,806,000	3,901,000	24,000
France	3,303,000	3,348,000	91,000
Italy	3,125,000	3,373,000	83,000
Germany	3,049,000	3,311,000

* Brassey's Naval and Shipping Annual, 1928.

1. Includes laid-up sea-going tonnage.

2. Tonnage laid up.

COMPARISON OF PER CAPITA FOREIGN TRADE AND NAVAL EXPENDITURES*

	Naval Exp. Per Capita 1925-6	Trade 1925	Naval Exp. Per Capita 1926-7	Trade 1926	Comparison 1925-26 and 1926-27
JAPAN	\$1.93	\$33.86	\$2.02	\$37.06	
Ratio of naval expenditures to foreign trade	1.00 to	17.54	1.00 to	18.34	4% decrease
UNITED KINGDOM	6.63	240.00	6.36	218.11	
Ratio of naval expenditures to foreign trade	1.00 to	36.20	1.00 to	34.27	5% increase
UNITED STATES	2.67	80.10	2.93	80.98	
Ratio of naval expenditures to foreign trade	1.00 to	30.00	1.00 to	27.63	8% increase

*Based on the foreign trade figures given above and budget appropriations tabulated below, and the populations figures for 1924 as given in U. S. Statistical Abstract, 1925. p. 812-4.

COMPARATIVE BUDGET APPROPRIATIONS FOR NAVAL DEFENCE¹

(In thousands of dollars)

	1921-22	1922-23	1923-24	1924-25	1925-26	1926-27
BRITISH EMPIRE	432,342	306,087	285,688	290,694	312,084 ²	299,951*
United Kingdom	413,950 ²	284,929	266,866	274,663	298,580	286,882
Australia	14,376	11,561	11,104	9,336	10,091*	10,217*
Canada	2,064	2,318	1,361	1,400	1,400*
India		6,818	4,701	3,609	3,478*	3,838*
New Zealand	1,480	1,028	1,393	1,380	2,149	2,600*
Union of South Africa	472	229	263	306	331*	349*
JAPAN	241,070	186,375	137,159	121,328*	112,342*	119,176*
UNITED STATES ⁴	426,192 ⁵	323,218	331,095	344,603	304,502	334,075 ⁶

1. League of Nations. *Armaments Yearbook*. 1924-25, 1925-26, 1926-27 [Fiscal year, April 1-March 31.]

2. Great Britain. *Finance Account of United Kingdom*. April 1, 1921-March 31, 1922.

4. Fiscal year, June 1 to May 31.

5. U. S. *Alternative Budget for the Service of the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1923*.

6. U. S. 69th Congress. 2nd Session. H. rep. n. 1660.

*Estimates.

APPENDIX II

COMPARATIVE NAVAL DATA *

TABLE I

LIGHT CRUISERS, 1st Line
5" to 8" Guns, 3,000-10,000 Tons, 27 Knots Plus.

POWER	BUILT		BUILDING		APPROPRIATED FOR		TOTAL	
	No.	Total Tonnage	No.	Total Tonnage	No.	Total Tonnage	No.	Total Tonnage
United States	10	75,000	2	20,000	6	60,000	18	155,000
British Empire	40 (a)	194,420	11	110,000	6	54,000	57	358,420
Japan	19	102,005	6	54,200	4	40,000	29	196,205

*From U. S. Navy Department figures, May 1, 1927.

(a) Does not include one Mine Layer, 1st Line, (Cruiser type) 6,740 tons.

Note: In addition to the ten light cruisers above the United States has 22 cruisers (11 second line cruisers and 11 second line armored cruisers) which includes all vessels of these types from the *Olympia* built in 1895 to the *Salem* of 1908 amounting to a total tonnage of 179,425. These vessels are obsolete because of low speeds, low gun power and short cruising radius.

Since these figures were published the British Government has restated its cruiser program as noted on page 329 of this report. In addition to the eleven 10,000-ton cruisers listed above, two cruisers of 10,000 tons are building for Australia, and one of 8,000 tons has been laid down this year. Six cruisers are projected, two of 10,000 tons and four of 8,000 tons. This published program does not extend beyond 1929.

The age and tonnage of American and British cruisers built is given in another table with this appendix. The comparative strength of the two navies in modern cruisers of 7,500 tons and over may be estimated as follows:

POWER	BUILT		BUILDING		APPROPRIATED FOR	
	No.	Total Tonnage	No.	Total Tonnage	No.	Total Tonnage
United States	10	75,000	2	20,000	6	60,000
Great Britain	6	54,000	14	138,000	6	52,000

TABLE II
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

POWER	BUILT		BUILDING		TOTAL		Total Tonnage
	No.	Total Tonnage	No.	Total Tonnage	No.	Total Tonnage	Allowed by Treaty
United States	1	12,700	2 (a)	66,000	3	78,700	135,000
British Empire ...	4	67,290	2 (b)	37,200	6	104,490	135,000
Japan	2	36,400	1 (c)	26,900	3	63,300	81,000

(a) LEXINGTON and SARATOGA which were building as battle cruisers, are being completed as Aircraft Carriers.
 (b) COURAGEOUS and GLORIOUS, originally a special type of cruiser, are being reconstructed into aircraft carriers. A seaplane carrier is reported to have been laid down in 1926 for the Australian Navy, characteristics unknown.
 (c) KAGA formerly building as battleship.

Note: Since this table was published the *Lexington* and *Saratoga* have been completed, giving the United States a total of three aircraft carriers.

TABLE III

DESTROYER LEADERS—4" plus, 1,500 tons plus, 27 knots plus.
 DESTROYERS, 1st Line—4" plus, 800-1,500 tons, 27 knots plus.

POWER	BUILT				BUILDING OR APPRO. FOR				TOTALS			
	Leaders		Destroyers		Leaders		Destroyers		Leaders		Destroyers	
	Total		Total		Total		Total		Total		Total	
	No.	Tonnage	No.	Tonnage	No.	Tonnage	No.	Tonnage	No.	Tonnage	No.	Tonnage
United States ..			(a)								(a)	
			276	329,153	1	(b)		(b)			276	329,153
British Empire . 18	31,310	160	185,915	1	1,800	8	10,640	19	33,110	168	196,555	
Japan	None	82	91,430	24	40,800	2	2,890	24	40,800	84	94,320	

(a) Includes 14 light Mine Layers.

(b) Estimated, no characteristics available.

TABLE IV

SUBMARINES, 1st Line,
 3" Guns Plus: 700 Tons Plus: 13 Knots Plus.

POWER	BUILT		BUILDING OR APPRO. FOR		TOTAL	
	No.	Total Tonnage	No.	Total Tonnage	No.	Total Tonnage
United States	50	43,822	—	—	50	43,822
British Empire	29	26,040	—	—	29	26,040
Japan	35	29,394	1	988	36	30,392

TABLE V

FLEET SUBMARINES

Includes: Fleet Submarines, Cruiser Submarines, Mine Laying Submarines,
 Monitor Type Submarines.

POWER	BUILT		BUILDING OR APPRO. FOR		TOTAL	
	No.	Total Tonnage	No.	Total Tonnage	No.	Total Tonnage
United States ...	6	9,816	3	(b)	9	9,816 (a)
British Empire ..	10	15,750	15	20,285 (b)	25	36,035 (b)
Japan	7	11,110	19	20,370 (c)	26	31,480 (c)

(a) Does not include tonnages of three submarines building.

(b) Estimated.

(c) Does not include the tonnage of the 4 Replacement Program Boats, the details of which have not been published.

Note: The figures given here for Great Britain do not agree with those submitted by the British delegation at Geneva. The latter made no distinction between fleet submarines and submarines, first line, but listed a total of 34 built, three building, six authorized and 18 projected.

APPENDIX III

NAMES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF PRINCIPAL SURFACE VESSELS OF THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN AND JAPAN

UNITED STATES

BATTLESHIPS

(Includes latest available information, 15 March, 1927.)

Name of Ship	Year Compltd.	Displacement	Main Armament	Speed (Knots)	Status
<i>Built</i>					
West Virginia	1923	32,600	8-16"	21.1	
Colorado	1923	32,600	8-16"	20.67	
California	1921	32,300	12-14"	21.46	
Maryland	1921	32,600	8-16"	21.07	
Tennessee	1920	32,300	12-14"	21.01	
Idaho	1919	32,000	12-14"	21.29	
New Mexico	1918	32,000	12-14"	21.08	
Mississippi	1917	32,000	12-14"	21.09	
Arizona	1916	31,400	12-14"	21.00	
Pennsylvania	1916	31,400	12-14"	21.05	
Oklahoma	1916	27,500	10-14"	20.58	
Nevada	1916	27,500	10-14"	20.53	
New York	1914	27,000	10-14"	21.47	Mod.*
Texas	1914	27,000	10-14"	21.05	
Wyoming	1912	26,000	12-12"	21.22	Mod.
Arkansas	1912	26,000	12-12"	21.05	
Florida	1911	21,825	10-12"	22.08	
Utah	1911	21,825	10-12"	21.04	Mod.
Total		(18) 525,850			

*Mod.—Under modernization.

BATTLE CRUISERS

Nil.

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

Name of Ship	Year Compltd.	Displacement	Main Armament	Speed (Knots)	Status
<i>Building</i>					
Lexington	L. D. 1921	33,000	8-8"	33.25	
Saratoga	L. D. 1920	33,000	8-8"	33.25	
Total		(2) 66,000			
<i>Built</i>					
Langley	1922	12,700	4-5"	15.00	

Building	No. 2	Tons 66,000
Built	1	12,700
Total	3	78,700

UNITED STATES
CRUISERS
(Includes latest available information, 15 March, 1927.)

Name of Ship	Year Compltd.	Displacement	Main Armament	Speed (Knots)	Status
<i>Authorized and Appropriated for</i>					
No. 26		10,000	9-8"		
No. 27		10,000	9-8"		
No. 28		10,000	9-8"		
No. 29		10,000	9-8"		
No. 30		10,000	9-8"		
No. 31		10,000	9-8"		
Total		(6) 60,000			
<i>Building</i>					
Pensacola	L. D. 1926	10,000	10-8"	32.5	
Salt Lake City	L. D. 1926	10,000	10-8"	32.5	
Total		(2) 20,000			
<i>Built</i>					
Memphis	1925	7,500	12-6"	34.43	
Marblehead	1924	7,500	12-6"	34.42	
Trenton	1924	7,500	12-6"	33.91	
Raleigh	1924	7,500	12-6"	34.63	
Cincinnati	1924	7,500	12-6"	34.44	
Concord	1923	7,500	12-6"	33.48	
Detroit	1923	7,500	12-6"	34.63	
Richmond	1923	7,500	12-6"	34.20	
Milwaukee	1923	7,500	12-6"	34.64	
Omaha	1923	7,500	12-6"	34.87	
Salem	1908	3,750	4-5"	25.95	Out*
Missoula	1908	14,500	4-10"	22.26	Out
Charlotte	1908	14,500	4-10"	21.91	Out
Chester	1908	3,750	4-5"	26.52	Out
Birmingham	1908	3,750	4-5"	24.33	Out
Huron	1908	13,680	4-8"	22.24	Out
St. Louis	1906	9,700	12-6"	22.13	Out
Seattle	1906	14,500	4-10"	22.27	
Charleston	1905	9,700	12-6"	22.04	Out
Frederick	1905	13,680	4-8"	22.41	Out
Pittsburgh	1905	13,680	4-8"	22.44	
Huntington	1905	13,680	4-8"	22.15	Out
Galveston	1905	3,200	8-5"	16.41	
Pueblo	1905	13,680	4-8"	22.24	Rec. Ship
Chattanooga	1904	3,200	8-5"	16.65	Out
Denver	1904	3,200	8-5"	16.75	
Des Moines	1904	3,200	8-5"	16.65	Out
Cleveland	1903	3,200	8-5"	16.45	
Albany	1900	3,430	8-5"	20.52	Out
New Orleans	1898	3,430	8-5"	20.00	Out
Olympia	1895	5,865	10-5"	21.67	Out
Rochester	1893	8,150	4-8"	21.00	
Total		(32) 254,425			

*Out—Out of Commission.

UNITED STATES

CRUISERS (Cont'd)

(Includes latest available information, 15 March, 1927.)

Authorized and Appropriated for...	No.	Tons
Building	2	20,000
Built	32	254,425
Total	40	334,425

GREAT BRITAIN

BATTLESHIPS

(Includes latest O. N. I. information, 15 March, 1927.)

Name of Ship	Year Compltd.	Displacement	Main Armament	Speed (Knots)	Status
<i>Building</i>					
Rodney	L. D. 1922	35,000	9-16"	23	
Nelson	L. D. 1922	35,000	9-16"	23	
Total		(2) 70,000*			
<i>Built</i>					
Ramillies	1917	25,750	8-15"/42	23	(b)
Royal Sovereign	1916	25,750	8-15"/42	23	
Revenge	1916	25,750	do.	23	
Royal Oak	1916	25,750	do.	23	
Resolution	1916	25,750	do.	23	(c)
Malaya	1916	27,500	do.	25	
Valiant	1916	27,500	do.	25	
Barham	1915	27,500	8-15"/42	25	
Queen Elizabeth	1915	27,500	do.	25	(c)
Warspite	1915	27,500	do.	25	
Benbow	1914	25,000	10-13.5"/45	21	(b)
Emperor of India	1914	25,000	do.	21	(b)
Marlborough	1914	25,000	do.	21	(b)
Iron Duke	1914	25,000	do.	21	(b)
Total		(14) 366,250			
(b) Reduced or special complement.		(c) Paid off for refit.			

*These ships are now completed.

	No.	Tons
Building	2	70,000
Built	14	366,250
Total	16	436,250

BATTLE CRUISERS

(Includes latest O. N. I. information, 15 March, 1927.)

Name of Ship	Year Compltd.	Displacement	Main Armament	Speed (Knots)	Status
<i>Built</i>					
Hood	1920	41,200	8-15"/42	31.0	
Renown	1916	26,500	6-15"/42	31.5	
Repulse	1916	26,500	6-15"/42	31.5	
Tiger	1914	28,500	8-13.5"/45	30.0	
Total		(4) 122,700			

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

Name of Ship	Year Compltd.	Displacement	Main Armament	Speed (Knots)	Status
<i>Reconstructing</i>					
Courageous	1917	18,600	18-4.7"	31.0	(c)
Glorious	1917	18,600	do.	31.0	(c)
Total		(2) 37,200			
<i>Built</i>					
Hermes	1924	10,950	7-5.5"	25.0	
Eagle	1924	22,790	9-6"	24.0	
Argus	1918	14,450	6-4" AA	20.2	
Furious	1917	19,100	10-5.5"	31.0	
Total		(4) 67,290			

(c) Paid off for refit.

Reconstructing	No. 2	Tons 37,200
Built	4	67,290
Total	6	104,490

NOTE: In addition to the above, one aircraft carrier is projected, to be laid down in 1929; characteristics unknown. The Albatross (seaplane carrier) is reported as laid down in 1926 for the Australian Navy; characteristics unknown.

GREAT BRITAIN

CRUISERS

(Includes latest O. N. I. information, 15 March, 1927.)

Name of Ship	Year Compltd.	Displacement	Main Armament	Speed (Knots)	Status
<i>Building</i>					
Norfolk	L. D. 1927	10,000			
Dorsetshire	L. D. 1927	10,000			
York	L. D. 1927	8,000			
Sussex	L. D. 1927	10,000			
Devonshire	L. D. 1926	10,000		32.0?	
London	L. D. 1926	10,000		32.0?	
Shropshire	L. D. 1926	10,000		32.0?	
Australia (A)	L. D. 1925	10,000	8-8"	31.5	
Canberra (A)	L. D. 1925	10,000	8-8"	31.5	
Berwick	L. D. 1924	10,000	8-8"	31.5	
Cumberland	L. D. 1924	10,000	8-8"	31.5	
Suffolk	L. D. 1924	10,000	8-8"	31.5	
Cornwall	L. D. 1924	10,000	8-8"	31.5	
Kent	L. D. 1924	10,000	8-8"	31.5	
Total		(14) 138,000			
<i>Built</i>					
Adventure (ML)	1927	6,740	4-4.7" 1000 miner	21.75	Res.
Emerald	1926	7,550	7-6"	33.0	
Enterprise	1926	7,550	7-6"	33.0	
Effingham	1925	9,750	7-7.5"	30.5	
Frobisher	1924	9,750	7-7.5"	30.5	
Total		(5) 41,340			

GREAT BRITAIN
CRUISERS (Cont'd)

Name of Ship	Year Compltd.	Displacement	Main Armament	Speed (Knots)	Status
<i>Built (Cont'd.)</i>					
Adelaide (A)	1922	5,550	9-6"	25.3	
Diomedes (NZ)	1922	4,765	6-6"	29.0	
Despatch	1922	4,765	6-6"	29.0	
Capetown	1922	4,190	5-6"	29.0	
Durban	1921	4,650	6-6"	29.0	
Delhi	1919	4,650	6-6"	29.0	
Hawkins	1919	9,750	7-7.5"	30.0	
Cairo	1919	4,190	5-6"	29.0	
Calcutta	1919	4,190	5-6"	29.0	
Colombo	1919	4,190	5-6"	29.0	
Dunedin (NZ)	1919	4,650	6-6"	29.0	
Danae	1918	4,650	6-6"	29.0	
Dauntless	1918	4,650	6-6"	29.0	
Dragon	1918	4,650	6-6"	29.0	
Vindictive	1918	9,750	6-7.5"	30.0	
Carlisle	1918	4,190	5-6"	29.0	
Coventry	1918	4,190	5-6"	29.0	
Curacoa	1918	4,190	5-6"	29.0	
Cardiff	1917	4,190	5-6"	29.0	
Curlew	1917	4,190	5-6"	29.0	Res.
Ceres	1917	4,190	5-6"	29.0	
Caledon	1917	4,120	5-6"	29.0	(c)
Calypso	1917	4,120	5-6"	29.0	
Caradoc	1917	4,120	5-6"	29.0	
Concord	1916	3,750	5-6"	29.0	
Centaur	1916	3,750	4-6"	29.0	
Cambrian	1916	3,750	4-6"	29.0	
Canterbury	1916	3,750	4-6"	29.0	
Constance	1916	3,750	4-6"	29.0	(c)
Brisbane (A)	1916	5,400	8-6"	25.5	(c)
Castor	1915	3,750	4-6"	29.0	
Champion	1915	3,750	4-6"	29.0	
Calliope	1915	3,750	4-6"	29.0	(c)
Comus	1915	3,750	4-6"	29.0	
Conquest	1915	3,750	3-6"	29.0	
Carysfoot	1915	3,750	4-6"	29.0	Res.
Cleopatra	1915	3,750	4-6"	29.0	Res. (c)
Birmingham	1914	5,440	9-6"	25.5	
Lowestoft	1914	5,440	9-6"	25.5	
Aurora (C)	1914	3,500	2-6"	29.0	(j)
Sydney (A)	1915	5,400	8-6"	25.5	
Melbourne (A)	1913	5,400	8-6"	25.5	
Yarmouth	1912	5,250	8-6"	25.0	(b)
Dartmouth	1911	5,250	8-6"	25.0	Res.
Weymouth	1911	5,250	8-6"	25.0	
Total		(50) 249,410			

(A) Australian Navy.
(C) Canadian Navy.
(NZ) New Zealand Division.

(c) Paid off for refit.
(j) Paid off.

GREAT BRITAIN

CRUISERS (Cont'd)

(Includes latest O. N. I. information, 15 March, 1927.)

	No.	Tons
Building	14	138,000
Built	50	249,410
Total	64	387,410

NOTES: In addition to the above, three 10,000-ton and six 8,000-ton Cruisers are projected, to be laid down 1927-1929. British official publication, "Fleets (The British Empire and Foreign Countries)" for 1927, lists Cruisers Emerald and Enterprise at 7,100 tons each, decreasing above total tonnage 900 tons. (b) Reduced or special complement.

JAPAN

BATTLESHIPS

(Statistics of 15 March, 1927.)

Name of Ship	Year Compltd.	Displacement	Main Armament	Speed (Knots)	Status
		<i>Built</i>			
Mutsu	1921	33,800	8-16"/45	23	
Nagato	1920	33,800	do.	do.	
Hiuga	1918	31,260	12-14"/45	do.	
Ise	1917	31,260	do.	do.	
Yamashiro	1917	30,600	do.	22.5	
Fuso	1915	30,600	do.	do.	
Total		(6) 191,320			

BATTLE CRUISERS

Name of Ship	Year Compltd.	Displacement	Main Armament	Speed (Knots)	Status
		<i>Built</i>			
Kirishima	1915	27,500	8-14"/45	27.5	
Haruna	1915	27,500	do.	do.	
Hiyei	1914	27,500	do.	do.	
Kongo	1913	27,500	do.	do.	
Total		(4) 110,000			

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

Name of Ship	Year Compltd.	Displacement	Main Armament	Speed (Knots)	Status
		<i>Building</i>			
Kaga	To comp. 1927	26,900		25.3	
		<i>Built</i>			
Akagi	1926	26,900	10-8"/50	28.5	
Hosho	1922	9,500	4-5.5"/50	25	
Total		(2) 36,400			

	No.	Tons
Building	1	26,900
Built	2	36,400
Total	3	63,300

JAPAN

CRUISERS

(Includes latest O. N. I. information, 15 March, 1927.)

Name of Ship	Year Compltd.	Displacement	Main Armament	Speed (Knots)	Status
<i>Building</i>					
Haguro	L. D. 1925	10,000	8-8"/50	33.5	
Ashigara	L. D. 1925	10,000	do.	do.	
Myoko	L. D. 1924	10,000	8-8"/50	33.5	
Nachi	L. D. 1924	10,000	do.	do.	
Aoba	L. D. 1924	7,100	6-8"/50	33	
Kinugasa	L. D. 1924	7,100	do.	do.	
Total		(6) 54,200			
<i>Built</i>					
Kako	1926	7,100	6-8"/50	33	
Furutaka	1926	7,100	do.	do.	
Naka	1925	5,595	7-5.5"/50	33	
Abukuma	1925	5,570	do.	do.	
Jintsu	1925	5,595	do.	do.	
Sendai	1924	5,595	do.	do.	
Yubari	1923	3,100	6-5.5"/50	33	
Isudzu	1923	5,570	7-5.5"/50	do.	
Yura	1923	5,570	do.	do.	
Kinu	1922	5,570	7-5.5"/50	33	
Natori	1922	5,570	do.	do.	
Nagara	1922	5,570	do.	do.	
Tama	1921	5,500	7-5.5"/50	33	
Kitakami	1921	5,500	do.	do.	
Kiso	1921	5,500	do.	do.	
Oi	1921	5,500	do.	do.	
Kuma	1920	5,500	7-5.5"/50	33	
Tenryu	1919	3,500	4-5.5"/50	31	
Tatsuta	1919	3,500	do.	do.	
Yahagi	1912	4,950	8-6"/45	26	Res.
Hirado	1912	4,950	do.	do.	
Chikuma	1912	4,950	do.	do.	
Tone	1910	4,100	2-6"/45	23	
Nisshin	1904	7,700	4-8"/45	20.4	
Kasuga	1904	7,700	1-10"/40	20.0	
			2-8"/45	20.0	
Tsushima	1904	3,420	6-6"/40	20.0	Res.
Iwate	1901	9,826	4-8"/45	20.8	Res.
Idzumo	1900	9,826	4-8"/45	20.8	
Yakumo	1900	9,735	do.	20.5	
Adzuma	1900	9,426	do.	20.0	
Asama	1899	9,885	4-8"/45	21.5	
Chitose	1899	4,992	2-8"/45	22.5	Res.
Total		(32) 193,465			

NOTE: In addition to the above, a five-year Replacement Program, dating from 1 April, 1927, provides for four 10,000-ton cruisers.